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quotations with him.I . Introduction - The Problem*
1. It is widely appreciated that the early 1970's marked a
caesura in the evolution of the multilateral world trading
system. Whereas the period between the end of World War II
and the first oil price crisis was marked by at first a
gradual and then a deeper liberalization of world trade on a
generally multilateral basis, the ensuing period, which has
by no means ended, has been characterized by a resurgence in
protection of a particular kind: unilateral, selective, and
administrative. In addition, with the success of tariff re-
duction, the measures taken after 1973 are generally of the
non-tariff kind. Essentially, what were intended as safe-
guards of various kinds against unfair trade practices have
become a blunt instrument for protective ends, at least in
the case of individual industries. Presently, with the Uru-
guay Round of trade negotiations drawing to a close, a newer
instrument of unilateralism on the part of the United States
has emerged centerstage - the self asserted prerogative to
enforce open markets abroad, or to enforce fair trade there.
2. This paper addresses the role of U.S. trade policy in the
global trading system. Concern arises from departures from
the original principles of the multilateral trading system
as it has evolved in the post World War II era under the
leadership of the same United States. Quite apart from the
costs imposed on itself and others by any particular trade
policy measure adopted by that country, the deep malaise
about U.S. trade policy rests upon a perceived decline in
the desire or ability of the United States to promote the
maintenance of the system as intensively as it once had.
Accordingly, the concern is as often with how the United
States takes particular actions as with what those actions
are.
* • ••.••••.
Paper, prepared for the Joint Canadian-German Symposium on
"Regional Integration in the World Economy: Europe and
North America" in Kiel, March 1-2, 1990. The authors are
grateful to conference participants, particularly Alan
Rugman, and Bert Hofman of the Kiel Institute, for helpful
comments.- 2 -
3. The three basic principles of the post war trading system
are easily summarized as multilateralism, reciprocity, and
liberalization. The reciprocal aspect of the rules governing
the world trading system deserves a further word. It was a
constructive version of reciprocity, the idea being that if
one nation offered trade barrier concessions, that nation
was entitled to receive concessions. Since the goal of the
GATT has been liberalization, there was never any question
that reciprocity meant reciprocal disarmament, not recipro-
cal rearmament. Together with the MFN principle embodied in
the GATT, all trading partners were to benefit from recipro-
cal concessions agreed by any two. Thus, a mechanism was
built into the GATT to spread liberalization broadly while
maintaining reciprocity.
There is hardly a question that as far as tariff policy is
concerned, the U.S. has by and large practiced what it has
preached throughout the post war years (see column 1 of
Table 1). Tariff reduction, on a reciprocal, but multi-
lateral basis has proceeded apace through successive Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiation (MTN) Rounds. Recent concern about
U.S. trade policy indeed refers to the proliferation of
non-tariff measures, and implicit, but credible, threats to
extend them (see column 2 of Table 1). These usually are
aimed at individual trading partners, so there is no pre-
tence of non-discrimination, and with a few exceptions, no
compensating trade policy changes are offered, so there is
no pretence of reciprocity either. Such measures protect
domestic industry, so that the principle, or goal, of
liberalization is violated. Most recently, in the Trade Act
of 1988, the Executive Branch of the U.S. government has
been called upon to enforce fairness in trading partners'
markets, in some cases unilaterally, suggesting a policy of
"aggressive reciprocity" ("Super 301"). This paper addresses
the question of how this may impinge upon the international
trading system as a whole. Is it a benign or a malign force?
The paper draws on recent U.S. trade policy developments to
answer this question. . . : .. ,- 3 -
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II. Developments in U.S. Trade Policy
4. An appealing catch-all hypothesis apparently consistent
with the rise and decline of multilateralism, reciprocity,
and liberalization as goals of U.S. trade policy since World
War II is the "Hegemony Thesis" (Keohane, 1982). Broadly, it
asserts that the United States, as the hegemon which emerged
after 1945, was willing and able to pay for system mainten-
ance. It did so by offering greater concessions on trade
policy to other nations than would have been strictly
required on a reciprocal, quid pro quo basis. Such behaviour
induced other nations to abide by the rules of the multi-
lateral trading system, a set of rules bearing a distinctly
American imprint. Thus, the rise in U.S. power is associated
with a decline in U.S. and global protection, and the
resurgence of protection after 1973 is associated with a
perceived decline in U.S. power. While this hypothesis has
appeal because it identifies the provider of the public good
which is the multilateral trading system, a closer scrutiny
of U.S. trade policy since the war casts doubt on the
behavioral observation, and hence on the causal mechanism.
•5. More in accord with the actual evolution of U.S. trade
policy is the interpretation that the promotion of liberal-
ization was a result of fortuitous circumstances. In the
aftermath of World War II, the United States had much to
gain by working to liberalize world trade. It was the one
large country to emerge from the war with an intact manufac-
turing capacity, so that great export opportunities offered
themselves (Baldwin, 1986). It might be added that a surplus
on current account, induced by transfers and loans abroad,
left interest groups entrenched in agriculture and manufac-
turing with no cause to promote protection. Essentially all
goods were demanded abroad. While Baldwin (ibid.) does not
deny the role of the learning experience of the trade wars
accompanying the onset of the Great Depression, nor the im-
petus of the international rivalry of the Cold War, existing- 5 -
circumstances made it easy to build support for a liberal
trade regime and a liberal trade policy (Riedel, 1987). But
given the learning experience and hence the strong country's
strategy to promote western recovery through trade liberali-
zation, the critical condition, or fortuitous circumstance,
was the absence of organized interest in protection. As some
organized interests turned to protection well before the
early 1970's, individual moves away from multilateralism
emerged, long before there was any suspicion of a decline in
hegemony.
6. Thus beginning soon after World War II, the United States
adopted individual policies at variance with an overall pro-
fessed claim to press for liberalization. Although the agri-
cultural trade was subject to special rules under the GATT -
essentially permitting national agricultural policies mod-
eled on those of the U.S. - multilateralism and reciprocity
were in no way relinquished. Domestic. U.S. pressure led to
unilateral action on dairy quotas in 1950, and additional
farm products in 1951 (Winham, 1986, pp. 152 ff.). The U.S.
was found in violation of GATT, and was "rebuked" (ibid.).
This episode marks the beginning of a tension in U.S. trade
policy that was to become more and more pronounced, right up
to the present day. For, administration policy undoubtedly
wished to promote liberality; it could not when confronted
with powerful domestic pressures. Because of the requirement
to legitimize its overall policy stance, instead of accep-
ting the rebuke and proceeding with the business at hand,
the U.S. sought, and received, a waiver from the GATT for
Furthermore, the interpretation of liberality as a lever
with which to pry open markets abroad is consistent with a
somewhat longer run of U.S. trade policy history. This was
the move toward unconditional MFN after World War I: the
U.S. "had a unilateral claim to any rollback of European
trade barriers, but without any obligation to reciprocate
with concessions of its own" (Riedel, 1988, p. 88). Even
the justly heralded Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1934 bears interpretation this way, certainly on the part
of the Congress (ibid.). That this act, under fortuitous
circumstances, could become a tool to liberalize world
trade is entirely consistent with this interpretation.- 6 -
agricultural trade. This, in turn, was the legal loophole
which permitted the establishment of the Common Agricultural
Policy in Europe, and which focuses trade policy acrimony in
agriculture to this day.
7. This perceived need~to legitimize deviations from GATT
principles so as not to threaten an overall liberal stance
wrought havoc again in the textile and clothing trade. Once
more, the U.S. set the precedent for an internationally le-
gal form of protection and the "next 25 years of trade re-
straints" (Yoffie, 1983, pp. 44, 58). In 1955 the U.S. tex-
tile industry sought to torpedo the renewal of the Recipro-
cal Trade Act. It had well placed supporters in Congress.
The threat potential of the textile industry gave it much
leverage. It might be kept in mind that the source of con-
cern, Japanese textile exports, comprised a mere 2 p.c. of
U.S. apparent consumption at the time. The textile industry
sought escape clause action, putting the ball into the exe-
cutive's court, and anti-Japanese feeling in the textile
centers was fuelled. The idea of a VER came up because the
other options would have reduced U.S. credibility. Quantity
restrictions .(QR's) on balance of payment grounds could not
be invoked, and Article XIX (serious injury) tariff increa-
ses could not be undertaken unilaterally. Multilateral nego-
tiations would have taken time, and a presidential election
was due in 1955. The U.S. administration pressured Japan,
albeit only in the area of trade in textiles, and Japan
agreed in principle to negotiate a VER. The legalization of
a special trading regime, as in agriculture, came slightly
later, though, through the Short-Term Agreement on Cotton
Textiles. The then President Kennedy needed to break the re-
sistance of the textile industry to his planned major trade
initiatives, in turn required to obtain market access to the
EEC, and he had to maintain U.S. credibility for his trade
Tellingly, as soon as the agreement to agree had been
reached, Canada and West Germany asked (the Japanese) if
something similar could be worked out (Yoffie, ibid.,
p. 55).- 7 -
initiatives to succeed. The initiative also included the de-
sire for other countries to remove Article XXXV (non-appli-
cation to latecomers) and Article XII (balance of payments)
protection. A Geneva conference was called, and the results
legalized unilateral actions and bilateral agreement.
The Short Term Agreement (STA) was followed as planned, by
the Long Term Agreement, sold to the developing countries as
a means of guaranteeing increased market access to the indus-
trialized countries, but its significance from the present
point of view comes from the fact that the U.S. utilized its
new legal authority for unilateral action immediately.
8. It is worth bearing in mind that these events unfolded at
the same time that various MTN Rounds, were promoted by the
United States to further liberalize trade. Indeed, the STA
seems to have been the domestic price that had to be paid
for obtaining negotiating authority for the Kennedy Round.
The point of these illustrations is to show that unilateral-
ism and non-reciprocity crept into U.S. trade policy making
well before the era of the new protectionism in the 1970's.
Only, there were fewer U.S. industries under pressure from
imports then. Departures from multilateralism in "tariff po-
licy were made only under duress" (Riedel, 1988, p. 90).
These were the U.S.-Canada Automative Agreement of 1965,
which was undertaken to avoid Canadian domestic content
rules, and. U.S. acquiescence to the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) under pressure from the EEC.
9. Whereas during the 1950's and 1960's one can usefully
speak of incidents or episodes of non-tariff protection
which created new rules or rights, in turn undermining the
multilateral trading system, the subsequent two decades wit-
nessed the need to address trade problems broadly and fre-
quently. An increasingly articulated set of laws emerged,
which, while not revoking the authority first transferred to
the President with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of1934, increasingly encourages or even requires the executive
branch to act as the Congress wishes. These are the Trade
Act of 1974 which gained some prominence through its Section
301; the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 which transferred an-
ti-dumping/countervailing duty (AD/CVD) authority from the
Treasury Department to" the Commerce Department; the 1984
Trade and Tariff Act which tightened deadlines for action;
and the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act whose de-
bate in Congress was accompanied by sometimes nonsensical
demands.
III. Instruments and Procedures
10. The main instruments and procedures of U.S. trade policy
between MTN rounds are laid out in four sections of sequen-
tial trade acts. None of them are in any sense illegal un-
der the GATT. Nevertheless, the evolution of the content of
these four sections of law over time partly reflects the
thrust of U.S. trade policy, and partly reflects the tension
between the executive and the legislature.
11. First, is the "escape clause" (Section 201), which has
been around in may guises (Hufbauer, Berliner, Elliott,
1986, p. 7n). As constituted since 1974, the International
Trade Commission determines injury (or not) upon which the
President has the authority to raise tariffs, impose quotas,
grant adjustment assistance, or negotiate OMA's (Lande,
Van Grasstek, 1986, pp. 101-104). Such measures are GATT
consistent (Article XIX) if they apply to all trading part-
ners (non discrimination) and if the trading partners are
compensated. Furthermore, import relief is intended to last
for five years only, though it is renewable. Once intended'.
There are other sources of the U.S. executives' authority
on trade matters. But these sections were to become, be-
came, or may yet become the "cutting edge" of trade poli-
cy.as the major route to special protection, these grounds for
relief have withered on the vine. Petitions under Section
201 dropped dramatically after 1977 (ibid., p. 102) and con-
tinued to drop through 1987 (Grinols, 1989, p. 514). While
the share of petitions given positive treatment increased,
this was overcompensated by the drop in applications (ibid.).
The reason is that the President has much discretion in ta-
king action, and has frequently used his discretion to take
no action - in 40 p.c. of cases passing the ITC (Hufbauer,
Berliner, Elliott, ibid.). Over the years since the 1974
Trade Act, Congress has sought to soften the conditions un-
der which imports could be determined to have caused injury,
notably in the 1984 Act. Since 1974 Congress reserves for
itself the right to give an opinion on each case, though the
legal (but not political) force of such opinions is highly
dubious. Quantitatively significant cases of import relief
under Section 201, with their duration, have been ball bea-
rings (1974 - 1978), non-rubber footwear (1977 - 1981), col-
or televisions (1977 - 1982), CB radios (1978 - 1981),
bolts, nuts, large screws (1979 - 1982), prepared mushrooms
(1980 - 1983) and motorcycles (1983 - 1988) (ibid.). Except
when the President uses his authority to negotiate an Order-
ly Marketing Agreement (OMA), which is bilateral and may
bring in non-trade related threats, escape clause relief
causes only limited damage to the system as a whole. Indeed,
when adjustment assistance is granted, one may say that it
contributes to system maintenance.
12. In principle, the content of the two other GATT consis-
tent trade relief measures "Subsidized Imports or Counter-
vailing Duties (CVD)", Section 701, and Dumping or Anti-
Dumping Duties (AD), Section 731, are also supposed to con-
tribute to system maintenance, here to bringing interests
into the free trade camp which would otherwise join the pro-
tectionists. In practice, and until the advent of "Super 301"
of the 1988 Trade Act, these sections have been the real
stick of U.S.. trade policy, a stick largely driven autono-- 10 -
mously by the domestic interest groups hurt by foreign
trade. In contrast to the "Escape Clause" no formal authori-
ty is delegated to the President to negotiate VER's in lieu
of other import relief; in practice, the threat of AD/CVD
impositions by the ITC, makes the foreign rival pliant, and
the executive can and does negotiate with foreign suppliers
in return for dropping the 701/731 investigation. The major
examples here are the semi-conductor agreement with Japan
and the steel regime negotiated with the.European Community,
which the Bush Administration reaffirmed, but only for 2 1/2
years.
13. It is important to note that 701/731 investigations are
strictly technocratic affairs handled by the ITC. The cen-
tral task of the ITC is to determine whether or not material
injury has been inflicted upon or is threatened to the peti-
tioners for protection or import relief. Once injury is
deemed to have occurred, which must be established within 45
days of filing the petition in a preliminary investigation,
90 % of cases end with an affirmative decision and corre-
sponding imposition of a punitive duty. "It follows that the
high success rates of the dumping and subsidy tests are
indicators of how broad the legal definitions are" (Finger,
Messerlin, 1989, p. 10). Any import practice that brings
injury to competing U.S. production is very likely to be
found to involve dumping or countervailable subsidization"
(ibid. p. 10). The 1988 Omnibus Trade Act went so far as to
make any subsidy, even if available to all industries,
countervailable (Grinols, 1989, p. 515), though GATT accepts
generally available subsidies. In anti-dumping, the 1988 act
seems to make price differences - be they predatory or not -
subject to CVD imposition. In addition, third markets and
downstream products are subject to U.S. action.
14. Though the definition may be broad, and hence trade re-
tarding, the greater damage to the system probably comes
from the selective negotiations of VER's in return for with-
drawing AD/CVD petitions.. During the 1980's 64 p.c. of cases- 11 -
initiated were resolved through VER's. But in only 42 p.c.
of cases that were superseded by VER's was the preliminary
injury determination confirmed in the final determination, a
figure similar to those which were not superseded by VER's
(Finger, Messerlin, Table 3 and p. 9). Clearly, AD/CVD in-
vestigations are used as threats, with more powerful coun-
tries granted "the courtesy of a negotiated settlement. Less
powerful countries receive in due course the determinations
made through normal staff procedures" (ibid., p. 12n). This,
too, constitutes a move away from multilateralism, distin-
guishing among the international political costs of hurting
different sized trade partners.
15. While import relief under the "escape clause" is little
used, and AD/CVD had become the instrument of choice for
protection seekers in the United States, Section 301 of the
1974 Trade Act with subsequent amendments, which is techni-
cally a trade remedy law, has been the focus of attention
recently. Section 301 constitutes the presidential retalia-
tion authority, empowering him to take all "appropriate ac-
tion" to obtain the removal of foreign trade barriers (Lan-
de, Van Grasstek, 1986, p. 41). It therefore brings exports
into its domain. The executive - here, the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative - has great leeway in determining whether to ac-
cept or reject petitions of firms, consulting with other
parts of the executive, and allowing the issue of interna-
tional political expediency to guide it. If a petition is
accepted, the executive negotiates with foreign governments
for removal of the alleged trade barrier - under threat of
retaliation. In so far as the petitions submitted under 301
refer to the jurisdiction of GATT, the law complements the
GATT in that where formal dispute settlement procedures ex-
ist, these must be initiated. If a GATT ruling is ignored,
the U.S. then unilaterally acts. Over the years, the content
of 301 has changed to encourage its use by the President. In
It began as Section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962.- 12 -
1979, time limits were placed on the framing of a response
to a petition. In 1984 "foreign unreasonable, unjustifiable
or discriminatory" practices were widened in definition.
And, in 1988, time limits for action were set and the. law
comes close to requiring retaliation. Services were always
encompassed by 301, but in 1984, foreign direct investment
was also included. The USTR can self-initiate actions; and
they don't have to be against illegal practices. Through
1988, the USTR opened over seventy cases under Section 301
(Finger, Messerlin, 1989).
17. The 1988 trade bill instituted at least ten changes in
the procedures of 301 actions which tend to make policy more
protectionist (Grinds, 1989, p. 512). The important ele-
ments seem to be
- authority to determine unfairness is transferred from the
President to the USTR, i.e. from a broad interest repre-
senter to a narrow interest representer;
- authority to retaliate is likewise transferred;
- the President can prohibit action, rather than take ac-
tion, something which is more likely to be politically
costly.
In any case, there are strict limits for decision-making, so
that the President's prior strategy of letting cases rest is
no longer feasible.
18. What has been the cumulative impact of all these meas-
ures? One must distinguish among three levels of impact:
First, any individual measure, taken against any individual
For all this, it shouldn't be forgotten that the nasty
bite of 301 applies only to issues where no trade agree-
ment exists (GATT, 11.12.89).^es hstifuts fur W
- 13 -
item, is likely to be harmless. This kind of protection has
been dubbed "porous" protection, because it leads to trade
diversion. The same product produced elsewhere, or a close
substitute produced in the target country, will be imported
more. On a second level, though, it highly resembles tradi-
tional protection. Invariably, petitions are brought forward
against the substitutes, thus eventually affecting a whole
industry and all suppliers. The steel agreement between the
U.S. and the EC is the largest case, in point. This kind of
protection is serious, but it exists only in a very few
industries. At the third level, the precedential affect of
U.S. trade law needs to be taken into account. Other
countries will take up the same rights for themselves, which
increases the probability of cumulative escalation. On
balance, it is probably fair to say that the damage is done
to the system, rather than to trade in any one commodity.
IV. "Aggressive Reciprocity"
1.9. Through the 1970's and 1980's, then, "escape clause" re-
lief was itself relieved through AD/CVD measures, in turn
de facto used to extract VER's. The increasing use of 301
reflects interest group driven action, like under 701/731,
but it gives much more discretion to the executive branch in
influencing other countries' trade policy. It was meant by
some to become the "cr.owbar" (Bhagwati, 1989); but it is in
fact a two-edged sword.
20. The game that is international trade policy making is a
simple prisoner's dilemma (Walbroek, 1987). Since all play-
ers are better off under a cooperative solution, the essen-
tial ingredient of proper institution building is inducing
cooperation. While it has been shown that a tit-for-tat
strategy will lead to cooperation, given an infinite time
horizon or sufficient discounting of the future (Axelrod,
1987), it has been objected that governments have too short- 14 -
time horizons (Bhagwati, 1990). Can an aggressively reci-
procal strategy induce cooperation? Taken by itself, it pro-
bably can't, for reasons to be considered. But the situation
of a U.S. trade policy maker, as well as the situation of
other countries has changed over the years, and the U.S.
response has only in part been one of aggressive reciproci-
ty.
21 . The U.S. trade policy maker has been confronted with a
rise in vociferousness of protectionist groups that find ac-
tive support in the Congress. This is essentially the result
of structural change in the U.S. economy, and recently a re-
sult of the current account deficit, which in turn induces
more structured change. Certainly free trade interests are
few and far between in the manufacturing sector, which was
once generally pro free trade. At the same time, the
Congress has thrust upon the President more powers or even
proscriptions to act. This makes it possible for the
interest groups to force the President's hand. A hint of how
this is done comes from strategic trade theory: A U.S. in-
dustry characterized by oligopolitic super-normal profits or
a quiet life sees its strategy threatened by the entry of
potent competitors abroad. To preserve its strategy, it re-
quires quantity limitations on imports. To obtain them, it
presses for legal price raising measures (AD/CVD) on a mas-
sive scale, relinquishing its demands on the administrative
system in return for negotiated quantity limitations. This
xs not a theoretical example, but what the U.S. steel indus-
2
try quite consciously did (Ven, Grunert, 1987) .
Harold Wilson is supposed to have said "A week in politics
is a long time".
Note that the government is not pursuing a strategic trade
policy here; rather the industry is inducing the govern-
ment to enforce actions which the industry cannot credibly
carry out (Krishna, 1989). Alan Rugman in an oral comment
at the conference, went so far as to claim that this firm
driven protection policy has given U.S. trade policy AIDS.- 15 -
22. The strong non-U.S. players themselves are relatively
unconcerned with the rise of aggressive reciprocity. The Eu-
ropean Community as a whole is inward looking on trade is-
sues as its interest groups focus attention on and policy
against Japan and increasingly, the developing countries.
The trade policy equilibrium between the Community and the
United States strongly favors the Community because agricul-
ture can be protected at will . The weak non-U.S. players
perhaps either have no incentive to promote freer trade or
cannot make sufficiently weighty counter offers. Most devel-
oping countries still favor the free-riding the GATT allows
through "special and differential treatment", and Japan is
only slowly becoming an importer of manufactures, so it
can't offer much to other countries. Agricultural trade lib-
eralization, as in Europe, is associated with high political
cost for the ruling party.
23. Thus, a U.S. administration wishing to promote free
trade needed to meet two challenges - a domestic one,
brought up by the breakdown of the free trade coalition in
manufacturing, and a foreign one, brought up by resistance
to further moves toward free trade. To get around the domes-
tic challenge, the trade liberalization agenda had to be
widened, so that a new free trade coalition could be forged.
Agriculture, services, intellectual property, and foreign
direct investment had to be brought in for domestic reasons;
these areas had benefitted from structural change. But the
agenda widening had to be accepted abroad. From the adminis-
tration's point of view, 301 was necessary as a credible
threat in getting the Uruguay Round Agenda widened. The mes-
sage was: If you don't negotiate about these issues, we'll
take unilateral action. A report on foreign trade barriers
compiled under Section 303 in 1985 as a threatened list of
actions suitable.for 301, the USTR Clayton Yeutter said "it
shows why we need a multilateral round of negotiations."
Therefore, almost any agreement oh agriculture in the
Uruguay Round will weaken the Community.- 16 -
24. Bhagwati (1989), for one, doubts the sincerity of such
views, indicating that 301 was not necessary to end the Eu-
ropean Community's resistance to agenda widening (p. 57)- He
suggests that
(i) the Community eventually realized that inclusion of
new issues would bring it benefits;
(ii) the Community feared that the U.S. would embrace
regionalism;
(iii) the Community feared the protectionist mood in
Congress.
It is noteworthy that two of the alleged reasons cited for
Community enlightenment are based on fear. If one considers
that agriculture was one of the new issues to be placed on
the agenda, the Community was afraid for good reason. After
all, since the United States led the agricultural trade is-
sue into a dead end with its 1955 GATT waiver (supra.), the
EC has resisted negotiating agriculture on the same basis as
all,other issues in the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds (Winham,
1986).
25. Nevertheless, there are fundamental objections to 301
type actions from the point of view of the world trading
system. Export interests in the United States need no longer
"do battle" with the protectionists at home; they can serve
their interests better by filing 301 petitions so that the
government opens specific markets to them, rather than being
forced to liberalize all markets (Finger, Messerlin, p. 26;
Bhagwati, p. 59). At the technical trade level, the use of
301 against politically weak countries doesn't open their
markets to all, but just to the United States. This consti-
tutes trade diversion, not trade creation. Finally, the GATT
dispute settlement procedure itself is on the agenda at the
Uruguay Round. Here, indications are that the U.S. is trying
to legitimize internationally the use of 301 type actions.- 17 -
If this effort were successful, the problems indicated above
would materialize in all countries.
26. The structure of the problem from the point of view of
the world trading system is simple in principle: How does
one induce cooperative behaviour into the prisoner's dilemma
game that is international trade policy making. Each member
does require the capability of a threat potential, otherwise
it will be exploited. The practical problem consists of us-
ing the threat potential to induce cooperation. Here, the
acrimony associated with 301 cases is probably not very
helpful. Given the relative decline in the U.S.'. share of
world trade, it is questionable whether completely aggres-
sive behavior would induce cooperative behavior on the part
of other countries.
27. Any positive effect of 301 on the world trading system
has to derive from its joint use with positive, cooperative
trade policy measures, such as the initiation of the Uruguay
Round. A stick alone is unlikely to achieve the goal of sys-
tem maintenance; a carrot has to be provided as well. The
peculiar Janus faced view of U.S. trade policy derives from
the presence of two bodies responsible for trade policy -
the Congress and the President. Congress, as the collector
of sectional interests, provides the President with the
stick, which he sometimes reluctantly accepts. The Presi-
dent, considering wider interests, including international
ones, has to provide the carrot. Until now he has done so,
not always completely successfully, but creatively, as exem-
plified by the agenda widening activities of the Uruguay
Round.
While agenda widening may have been conceived as a way of
harnessing new U.S. export interests, the wider implications
are still more positive. For, a broader agenda makes possi-
ble more policy trades among countries, increasing the like-- 18 -
lihood of reaching maximal openness in the trading system.
Of course, it increases negotiating costs, that is, the du-
ration of negotiations, as well, but that is a small price
to pay.
28. A remaining tangible danger for the world trading system
engendered by U.S. behavior, and not precluded by the MTN
Rounds is the legalization and legitimation of dead ends in
trade policy, presently exemplified by 301 type behavior.
This is an imminent danger because of U.S. concern with the
legalities. As with agriculture and clothing and textiles,
institutionalization confers rights on other countries,
rights which they themselves may never have demanded but
which once granted, confer influence on domestic interest
groups to get the rights used. If Uruguay sanctions 301
type action, that would make the world trading system less
efficient unless broad based negotiations like during MTN
Rounds becomes continuous, which is unlikely.
V. Remedies?
29. It is tempting to examine the institutional workings of
the U.S. government, (re)discover that Congress is the store
of protectionist sentiment, the President - on average, and
not before presidential elections - the upholder of a liber-
al mulitlateral trading order, and suggest that the presi-
An example is the West German experience with the textile
and clothing lobby. Before the STA the government was set
on a course to remove remaining import quotas and the lob-
by was disciplined by the framework of broad interest
group representation so characteristic of West Germany.
After the STA, textile protection became an issue just
like in other countries. Even the Bundestag, normally re-
ticent on trade matters, felt it had to take a stand on
the issue (Mill ler-Godef roy , 1983).- 19 -
dency be strengthened at the expense of Congress, or to de-
clare Congress the villain and leave it at that. Aside from
the utopianism inherent in such an approach, it is important
to understand that the protectionist sentiment in Congress
has a function beneficial to the world trading system - it
frames the credible threat which makes other countries re-
nounce protection out of fear of retaliation. A much more
important weakness of the system is that it is dependent up-
on the executive branch's innovativeness in harnessing ex-
pert interests together with foreign interests to beat the
protectionists. This could better be done in a multilateral
framework, and promises to result from the Uruguay Round
(under the heading of "strengthening the GATT" if not "dis-
pute settlement").
30. Since about 1980, when protectionist sentiment in Con-
gress started blossoming, the U.S. has been swept by discus-
sion of the trade deficit and the associated though partly
independent, issue of deindustrialization. Aggressive trade
policy is justified on plainly incorrect macroeconomic
grounds and highly dubious microeconomic grounds. But these
are merely the catchwords used in a public debate. Structu-
ral change in the United States, with or without a trade de-
fxcit, would have led to a shift of interest group power
anyway. This process would have occurred even if structural
change had stayed within the confines of the manufacturing
sector, for there too, the new industries are located out-
side the traditional manufacturing centers and generally of-
fer no countervailing power within the groups of organized
labor.
31. In many ways, the U.S. is merely reverting to a role it
formerly fulfilled in the world economy - a country like any
other. Gone are the fortuitous circumstances when it could
lead to liberal trade by the use of promises. Rather,
threats are needed, too. For all that, successive U.S. ad-
ministrations have not lost sight of the goal of liberal
trade. They just have to overcome more intransigence at home- 20 -
and abroad. Here, it would be helpful if a U.S. administra-
tion could credibly pre-comnit itself to avoiding unilater-
alism and protectionism vis-a-vis the Congress. The way to
do that is clear - it is by international agreement.
What could be agreed upon? First, agenda widening in itself
is already a positive step. In addition, the multilateral
elements of the GATT could be strengthened. Because the ad-
ministered protection of AD/CVD has become so widespread,
including in the European Community, the imposition of such
duties should become a multilateral issue. The administra-
tive boards determining injury and setting the remedy could
be internationalized, along the lines of review panels fore-
seen in the Canada - U.S. Free Trade Agreement (Hufbauer,
1989). These panels are meant to establish common rules over
time, in addition to merely deciding cases brought forward.
Indeed introducing such elements into the GATT is a stated
U.S. negotiating objective in the Uruguay Round (Schott,
1939). If accepted, such a mechanism would get around the
consensus condition required by GATT, whereby the defendant
has' effective veto power.
Another possibility is a' "GATT plus" as an application of
conditional MFN (Ostrey, 1989). Clearly, some countries
could liberalize trade with each other at little domestic
cost. They could move toward freer trade more quickly than
on a completely multilateral basis, perhaps forming customs
unions. Since it can be expected that joining countries
would prosper, an imitation effect could be expected
(Giersch, 1986). Also, this idea prevents free riding on the
system.
A step already undertaken is enhanced trade policy surveil-
lance under the auspices of the GATT. While this sort of
activity generates transparency and therefore helps mobilize
consumers, it is better than U.S. surveillance because it is- 21 -
undertaken by a multilateral agency, enhancing its legitima-
cy.
Finally, it is relatively clear that major multilateral li-
beralization has been achieved through the instrument of the
trade rounds, all eight of which were initiated by the Unit-
ed States (Schott, 1989). Between rounds, the mundane acti-
vities, like the passage of U.S. trade laws, make their
effects felt. Thus, one observes only occasional spurts of
liberalization but a continuous process of protectionist
activity. To redress this balance, a mechanism should be
found to make liberalization a more continuous process. In
the earlier post-war years the U.S. created some long term
problems by institutionalizing exceptions to normal
procedures. Why can't one institutionalize the trade
liberalization process to exhibit more continuity?
In any case, suggested remedies for the international tra-
ding system need to be strewn widely - to the United States,
to the European Community, to Japan, and to the Developing
Countries.- 22 -
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